Serious Fraud Office reports an increase in companies self-reporting

According to an article in the Financial Times on 14 January 2013, the number of companies voluntarily admitting wrong doing to the Serious Fraud Office, otherwise known as self-reporting, has nearly doubled in the past fiscal year.  The FT suggests that this indicates that the new anti-bribery legislation, the Bribery Act 2010, is proving to be a deterrent.

The article goes on to report that 12 companies had “confessed to the SFO that they had issues in the year ending March 31st compared with seven during the two preceding years, according to data from a Freedom of Information request”.

The article suggests that one reason for the increase in self-reporting could be the introduction of the Bribery Act in July 2011, which enables the SFO to prosecute people for corruption no matter where in the world it takes place, as long as there is a link to the United Kingdom.

However, in our view this is only part of the story.  The stiffer penalties and more far reaching legislation, including the global extra territorial reach of the Bribery Act, are an important factor, but other factors are the increased political and prosecutorial interest in the enforcement of anti-corruption laws.  In addition, the encouragement in civil settlements by the SFO over the past three or four years, under the previous Director, Richard Alderman, and the promised introduction of Deferred Prosecution Agreements by the government in the near future, is changing the way that defendants and their lawyers behave when considering possible actions, following discovery of an offence having been committed.  The commercial desire to dispose of a problem as quickly as possible, and as cheaply as possible, where there would be less damage to a company’s brand image and products than defending the case through a trial is likely to be a very significant driver in deciding whether to report corruption issues to the Serious Fraud Office.  Coming clean about embarrassing issues does not come naturally to many corporations, nor hitherto to their defence lawyers, but the threat of unlimited fines, combined with the possibility of public procurement debarment orders, the damage to reputation, and the likelihood of the withdrawal of some of your business partners from relationships with you, are  important  factors to consider when weighing the alternatives to self reporting.

The fact that there were only twelve companies self-reporting to the SFO in the year ending 31 March 2012, however, is still in our view pitifully low and we think that this is likely to be the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number of corporations who are now under the jurisdiction of the British Courts under the Bribery Act and who have reportable issues.  We would expect this figure to grow and grow, particularly when the SFO starts to prosecute high profile corporations.  The reader may recall that the new director of the SFO, David Green QC, has indicated that whilst he will still consider settling with companies that self-report in the appropriate circumstances, there will be cases where even though a company has self-reported, due to the seriousness of the crime it may be in the public interest to prosecute in any event.  As the FT article itself states, Mr Green’s new stance “…could result in fewer companies coming forward, however”.

SEC and DOJ release long awaited FCPA Guidance

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Department of Justice have jointly just released their new guidance for businesses under the FCPA, styled as a "resource guide". Here it is. This guidance has been long awaited and was produced as a result of a request made at the beginning of the year by many American organisations who together represent over 3 million businesses in the US in the form of a letter to the SEC and the DOJ. We blogged on that letter here.

The guidance is quite a tome at 120 pages, including the appendices, and is around 3 times longer than its UK Bribery Act counterpart, itself dated 30 March 2011. It is divided into the a number of chapters. This is what is inside:

  1. Introduction
  2. The FCPA: anti-bribery provisions
  3. The FCPA: accounting provisions
  4. Other related US laws
  5. Guiding principles of enforcement
  6. FCPA penalties, sanctions, and remedies
  7. Resolutions
  8. Whistleblower provisions and protections
  9. DOJ opinion procedure
  10. Conclusion

We will be working our way through it methodically over the next few days and will provide some initial thoughts on it as we proceed. A comparison with the UK Bribery Act guidance may be informative.

We do notice, however, that, like the UK version of the guidance, it is not intended to have legal effect, and so therefore will not bind any court or indeed any prosecutor.

Also, we do not know whether the guidance has addressed the many concerns which corporates and practitioners have been voicing about the FCPA.  A comparison with the February letter may also indicate whether these concerns have been adequately addressed.

Oxford University Press pays substantial civil settlement fine for corrupt overseas contracts and is debarred from World Bank tenders

According to a recent press release, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has taken action in the High Court, which has resulted in an Order that Oxford Publishing Limited (OPL) pay £1,895,435 in recognition of sums it received which were generated through unlawful conduct related to subsidiaries incorporated in Tanzania and Kenya.

OPL is owned by Oxford University Press (“OUP”), which itself is owned or is part of the universally esteemed and world famous Oxford University.

OUP discovered that its subsidiaries in Kenya and Tanzania had used illegal means to win contracts to sell its educational publications in these two countries. Some of these contracts are funded by the World Bank. OUP acted immediately to investigate the matter, instructing independent lawyers and forensic accountants to undertake a detailed investigation. Subsequently OUP self-reported some concerns which it had to the SFO.

The SFO required OUP to follow a procedure based on the guidance contained within its published protocol document - "The Serious Fraud Office's Approach to Dealing with Overseas Corruption".

Because two of the tenders were funded by the World Bank, OUP also voluntarily reported on a potential breach of the World Bank's Procurement Guidelines to the World Bank.

The investigation was thorough - involving numerous interviews and an extensive review of documents and electronic data - and completed to the satisfaction of the SFO. The substantial product of those investigations was presented to the SFO and, in a separate presentation, to the World Bank. The product of that work led the SFO and the World Bank to believe that OUP East Africa ("OUPEA") and OUP Tanzania ("OUPT") had offered and made payments, directly and through agents, intended to induce the recipients to award competitive tenders and/or publishing contracts for schoolbooks to OUPEA and OUPT. 

Civil Recovery Order

As wholly owned subsidiaries, OUPEA and OUPT pay dividends and certain fees to OPL.  Accordingly, OPL has and would receive revenue that had been derived from unlawful conduct; namely bribery and/or corruption. Following an accounting examination of the benefit obtained from the affected contracts, the SFO was in a position to determine the appropriate amount to be recovered.  The approach to costs was conservative, with the result that the agreed methodology produced a higher figure than would normally be recognised as trading surplus in the accounts.  No allowance has been made for the payments which are considered bribes or inducements. 

Compliance procedures

Since the occurrence of the conduct that is the subject matter of the civil recovery order, OUP has introduced enhanced compliance procedures intended to significantly reduce the risk of recurrence of such conduct within OUP.  These procedures will be subject to review by a monitor who will report to the Director of the SFO within twelve months, with additional and separate reporting to the World Bank.  The monitor must meet strict criteria including clear independence from OUP.

Reasons for civil recovery order

A number of relevant features have led to the decision to pursue a civil recovery order in place of a criminal prosecution.  They include the following (we will not repeat them all but the most relevant appear to be as follows):

a)        The test under the Code for Crown Prosecutors in relation to the case meeting the criteria to prosecute has not been met at this point and there is no likelihood that such a standard would be met in the future.  This view is based on a number of factors including, but not limited to, (i) key material obtained through the investigation is not in an evidentially admissible format for a criminal prosecution and (ii) witnesses in any such prosecution would be in overseas jurisdictions and are considered unlikely to assist or co-operate with a criminal investigation in the UK.

b)        OUP has conducted itself in a manner which fully meets the criteria set out in the SFO guidance on self reporting matters of overseas corruption.

c)        The products supplied were of a good standard and provided at 'open market' values.  This means that the jurisdictions involved have not been victims as a result of overpaying for the goods or as a result being supplied goods which were unsuitable or not required.

Finally the SFO Press Office reports that in addition to the property recovered under the civil recovery order, OUP unilaterally offered to contribute £2,000,000 to not-for-profit organisations for teacher training and other educational purposes in sub-Saharan Africa.  This was a reflection of the seriousness with which OUP views the course of events that were subject to the investigation and a wish to acknowledge that the conduct of OUPEA and OUPT fell short of that expected within its wider organisation.  The contribution would benefit the people within the affected region and be consistent with the overall mission of OUP.  The offer also confirmed that the funds would not be used so as to provide OUP with a commercial advantage.

This press release appears to address previous criticisms which were made of the SFO that it had not been sufficiently transparent about the settlements it had made, no doubt being leant on by the corporate defendants and their lawyers to be treated in confidence.

It also reinforces the view which the SFO publicly encourages that where the illegal acts are not systemic within the organisation, and particularly in circumstances where the organisation owns up to the wrongdoing by self reporting, the SFO will “reward” the defendant by offering a civil settlement.

The use of a monitor, a frequent practice in the US, and used in the Innospec case in the UK has been employed in this case too and signals to the defendant and to other corporates the tremendous burden on your organisation if you are unable to put in robust compliance procedures – the court will make sure that you do it by the imposition of a monitor, which itself is costly.

This appears to be the first civil settlement approved by the new Director of the SFO, David Green QC. It confirms what he has said publicly, that he will agree to civil settlements where appropriate (even though they have been the source of criticism in the past) but the SFO will prosecute when it is the public interest to do so.

Related court documentation is linked to on the SFO’s own press release.

In a separate press release from the World Bank on 3 July 2012, it said  that the World Bank Group had announced the debarment of two wholly-owned subsidiaries of Oxford University Press (OUP), namely: Oxford University Press East Africa Limited (OUPEA) and Oxford University Press Tanzania Limited (OUPT) - for a period of three years following OUP’s acknowledgment of misconduct by its two subsidiaries in relation to two Bank-financed education projects in East Africa.

The debarment is part of a Negotiated Resolution Agreement between OUP and the World Bank Group.  In May 2011, investigators from the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) approached OUP about potential misconduct in Africa.  Following this, OUP conducted an internal investigation into its operations and reported its findings to INT.

This debarment is testimony to the Bank’s continued commitment to protecting the integrity of its projects.  OUP’s acknowledgment of misconduct and the thoroughness of its investigation is evidence of how companies can address issues of fraud and corruption and change their corporate practices to foster integrity in the development business.  In this case, working with the Serious Fraud Office also demonstrates the scope of collective action in deterring corruption impacting the progress of development,”

 said Leonard McCarthy, World Bank Integrity Vice President.

"Enforcing the law on fraud and corruption: does self reporting pay?"

This was the title of a seminar at which the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, Richard Alderman, spoke at the Said Business School and Oxford University on 6 March 2012.

The full text of the speech is here.  Actually the speech contains a review of the SFO’s activities in the area of corruption, and the various criminal procedures which are (or ought to be) available to it to deal with corruption offences.  As Mr Alderman is stepping down as Director soon (in April) it is a kind of goodbye and “this is what I have achieved – this is what more needs to be done - hand-over” speech to the new Director.

The Director began by making a few general comments about the genesis of the SFO 25 years ago; pointing out that it is a small office with about 300 staff and that the current budget is approximately £38 million and is decreasing.

Mr Alderman is of the view that the SFO has an important international role and that over the last three to four years in particular law enforcement has become increasingly internationalised.

He continues that the SFO’s view is that law enforcement in the modern environment is about far more than just prosecution

 “…it also involves education, prevention and disruption.  What this means is that the SFO places great emphasis on helping individuals and corporations get it right in the first place…of course, helping people get it right is of limited benefit if we don’t also tackle very vigorously those who have no intention of getting it right.  This is why I want to focus SFO resources as much as possible on the individuals and corporations who continue to act criminally rather than on those who are trying to get it right but have come unstuck in some way or another.”

Mr Alderman believes that although the SFO’s new policy which is to engage with corporations was initially regarded with suspicion by corporations, the SFO is now regarded as being sensible and constructive.

Our view, at the BriberyLibrary, is that for many people and corporations this new policy must be regarded as a sea change in attitude.  Hitherto, prosecutors have been regarded with great fear and suspicion.  In other countries, such as the United States, the various prosecuting bodies across the US are still, with considerable justification, regarded as very aggressive and uncooperative.  It is interesting, therefore, that British and American prosecutors are now working together much more closely despite the “cultural” differences.  Presumably the SFO’s cooperative approach, as outlined by the Director in this speech, may come as a surprise to many American prosecutors many of whom may formulate their own career paths and personal public profiles from aggressive and high profile prosecution strategies.  Whether the new Director, David Green QC, will adopt the same apparently cooperative approach remains to be seen.  Our sources, who know him, suggest he may be a lot more aggressive prosecutor than Mr Alderman.

Corruption

Back to Mr Alderman’s speech: he then turned to the subject of corruption, stating that this area of work had been one of the major changes in the United Kingdom over the last four years.  Prior to then “for one reason or another” there were no prosecutions relating to overseas corruption in the UK and the previous law was widely regarded as being wholly inadequate for modern purposes.  Mr Alderman publicly recognises that the UK’s reputation had also suffered great and lasting damage as a result of the decisions involving BAE Systems and Saudi Arabia (as reported in my blog post of 13 March 2012 and other earlier posts).

Mr Alderman takes the view that:

  1. The UK’s new Bribery Act 2010 has made a very great difference to the UK’s shattered (our word) reputation as it has replaced the previously unsatisfactory law with a range of new offences including one aimed specifically at corporations.
  2. Secondly, another feature of the new Bribery Act is the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Bribery Act and it will include the activities of many companies around the world.
  3. Companies internationally are now regarding the Bribery Act as the global gold standard for anti-corruption legislation and as a part of the rules that corporations internationally have to meet.
  4. Anti-corruption should just be one part of a company’s overall ethical approach, and that the tone should be set from the top of the organisation.
  5. That the SFO expects corporate boards to conduct risk assessments on themselves in order to identify what measures that need to take to mitigate the risks, and to look at agents in high risk countries in great detail.
  6. The SFO expects corporates to make sure that their processes are actually implemented in practice and that this should be done on a proportionate and commercial basis using sensible judgment.
  7. A number of corporations both British, American and indeed others are increasingly coming to visit the SFO to talk to them about what they are doing in terms of compliance.  It appears that corporations around the world are starting to wake up to the fact that the Bribery Act potentially has global application.

Self-Reporting

The Director stated that self-reporting was something that the SFO introduced in 2009 and reflects existing US practice.  In his view, the process has been a success in the UK and the SFO has had over twenty corporations come in to the SFO to self-report (he does not say over what period these twenty self-reports took place so it is unclear to us whether it is twenty since 2009 or twenty in the last twelve months).

Mr Alderman recognises that a corporation, when discovering that corruption has taken place within the organisation, is faced with a choice of whether to self-report or not to self-report, and hope that no one finds out.  He then outlined a number of reasons why a corporation may want to self report, as follows:

1. The SFO will work with the corporation on managing the reputational risk, pointing out that reputational damage can happen almost instantaneously and can be long lasting in its effect;=

2. The SFO can work with the corporation towards a civil law resolution of the problems which, if it happens, means that there is no criminal conviction for corruption, remembering that a conviction can lead to public procurement debarment in the EU and elsewhere which he claims: “this is a very powerful deterrent.  Indeed some companies could go out of business, faced with debarment”.

As an aside, we at the BriberyLibrary are not aware of many instances either in the UK or the US where public procurement debarment has been exercised or anywhere it has led to a company going out of business (if we are wrong, please tell us!).  This is perhaps because judges would regard this as an excessive and disproportionate punishment with unfathomable and unjustifiable consequences on shareholders, employees and others who supplied to the company and are reliant on the supply-chain for business.

3. Another advantage is the opportunity to work towards a relatively speedy outcome.  The damage to reputation will be much less if the result takes months to achieve, rather than several years, which can occur through the normal criminal processes.

How Self-Reporting actually works

The Director then explains how this all works.  Usually it starts with an allegation of bribery internally at the company, possibly through a whistleblower line.  The corporation does some preliminary work and then may bring in their professional advisers to investigate further.

It is only at this point that corporations tend to contact the SFO (presumably on advice) and they are required to involve the SFO in the processes of investigation.  Naturally they also want “full credit from us” for self reporting.  The Director states that that credit can come in the form of recognition that this process should have a civil and not a criminal outcome.

The Director explains that the case is discussed with the corporation at senior levels and that the SFO will normally agree that the investigation should be carried out by the corporation’s own professional advisers but that the SFO expects to negotiate the terms of reference and the work plan for the investigation.  The SFO also expects regular updates from the corporation so that there are no “surprises” when the eventual report comes to the SFO.

The SFO does not necessarily take the report completely at face value: they will probe it in order to find out whether the company has genuinely uncovered what has happened and has now faced up to the consequences.  Apparently, there can sometimes be a lengthy process of discussion with the company.

Civil Recovery

Mr Alderman reports that the SFO has been using its powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) to obtain recovery of the proceeds of criminal conduct.  Vivian Robinson QC has blogged on this subject previously here on 19 January 2012, in the context of the Mabey & Johnson case.

The Director reports (as he did in his speech, on which we blogged on 13 March 2012) that in cases where the choice is between a civil recovery order and no action at all, a civil recovery order is a good result.  However he reports that there are critics of the CRO procedure and that although these cases have to be approved by a High Court judge, less is published about the illegal conduct than would otherwise happen in a criminal case.  Another criticism apparently is that the SFO is only able to recover the proceeds of the unlawful conduct and cannot impose a fine on top of the civil recovery.

Because of these criticisms of the civil recovery process, the Director has been pushing for a more powerful system of settlement that would involve a “deferred prosecution”.

Deferred Prosecutions

The Director then outlined the way in which deferred prosecutions work and that this idea has been taken from the US where they have worked very powerfully within the criminal justice system.  In short, however, he says that in the US the Department of Justice and the corporation reach agreement about the criminal conduct that has taken place; there is agreement on the amount of the fine and other penalties; there is also agreement about monitoring and other measures, and a term for which the Department of Justice agrees to defer the prosecution for a set number of years.  That prosecution is then cancelled if the corporation complies with all the terms of the agreement and there would be no conviction in respect of corruption.

The agreement is then taken to a judge who is able to express his or her own views.

Mr Alderman very much wants to see deferred prosecutions in the UK and reports that the Solicitor General, Edward Garnier QC MP has been pushing this idea very hard in seminars and the media (including one seminar at QEB Hollis Whiteman this week which we attended and on which we may blog soon).  If it does become law in the UK then, when faced with a new case, the SFO will have a choice of either:

  1. No action at all;
  2. Making a civil recovery order;
  3. Entering into a deferred prosecution agreement; or
  4. Pursuing a full criminal prosecution.

He says that if it becomes law, “transparent guidelines” will need to be agreed and published.

He is adamant that a significant difference about the way in which things will have to work in the UK, as opposed to the way they work in the US, is that in the US, the Department of Justice and the corporation themselves reach agreement on the amount of the fine and other issues.  The courts in the UK have made it very clear in recent cases (in belligerent judgments in both Dougall and Innospec) that the SFO has no role to play in discussing questions of penalty or sentence.  Therefore Mr Alderman concludes that the only way to deal with this is to involve a judge at a much earlier stage, which itself will be a significant change.

A further change is that the SFO will still have to talk figures with the corporation which can then be brought to the judge so that the judge can express a view, otherwise he says this isn’t going to work (so in our view the SFO will have to tread carefully here, given Lord Justice Thomas' previous outburst on the subject).

Finally, the Director says that there must be much more transparency about the process so that when an agreement is reached, the facts can be explained in open court and documents placed on websites so that the public can see what has happened and that a judge has agreed to the proposals.

Plea Bargaining

The Director then turned to plea bargaining.  In the US, where plea bargaining is very common, he points out that there is a very striking difference between the sentence on pleadings guilty and the sentence after conviction following a contested trial.

In the UK the difference to the US approach is that plea negotiations tend to be engaged at a much later stage of the criminal process.  He repeats that British judges are not happy with the role of the SFO in these plea negotiations and certainly do not want the SFO to suggest a sentence to the judge.

He doesn’t say as much, but reading between the lines it looks like the Director thinks that this is something else that needs to be addressed by the legislature, as the plea negotiation process currently takes far too long.

Companies that do not self report

Mr Alderman concludes by warning that neither the Department of Justice nor the SFO will be sympathetic to a company which has failed to come forward with information.

Further, if the corporation (aware of the criminal activity) allows the corruption to go unpunished, then the profits of that crime may well form a separate offence under the UK’s anti money laundering legislation.

Furthermore, since the establishment of the new whistleblower line called “SFO Confidential”, they received in the first month 2000 reports.  In the US, by contrast, they have set up a whistleblower program with very large rewards for whistleblowers, so there is a very high incentive for someone else to report the corporation even if the corporation decides not to report itself.

If senior executives turn a blind eye to corruption, they themselves risk committing an offence personally under the new Bribery Act (section 14) as well as committing personal money laundering offences, concealing criminal conduct and perverting the course of justice.

In short, his message seems to be: whether or not a corporation self reports should not be regarded as an option for an ethical well run corporation.  It should do so automatically.

Finally, and with no real connection to the themes in his speech on self-reporting, the Director talked about the possibility of creating a new offence of recklessly running a financial institution.

He believes that a new offence needs to be created as there is not one specifically dealing with the conduct of senior executives whose reckless conduct led to the (2008) financial crisis (that we are currently still experiencing).  He reports that

 “there has been considerable interest in this from Parliamentarians and others.  I notice as well that the FSA has put forward proposals about changes to the criminal law in its report on RBS, although it has suggested a rather different solution to mine.  All of these issues will be for Parliament to consider.  I would like to see change”. 

Something for the new Director to pursue, perhaps, when he takes office in April?